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Against Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics: The Humean Challenge

Lorenzo Greco

Abstract


In this essay I discuss some elements of Hume’s virtue ethics that distinguishes it from the neo-Aristotelian approach. I stress some of its characteristics – its emphasis on character traits rather than on actions, the role it reserves for moral education, its being sentimentalist – and highlight its points of strength with respect to the neo-Aristotelian version. I do that by defending an interpretation of Hume’s virtue ethics in terms of a form of subjectivism hinging on individuals possessing virtuous or vicious characters.


Keywords


Hume; Aristotle; virtues and vices; character; subjectivism; moral pluralism

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.4454/teoria.v38i2.50

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